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Waging “Protracted Conflict” Behind
the Scenes
The Cold War Activism of Frank R. Barnett
✣ Jeffrey H. Michaels
Introduction
Referring to the significant political impact of the anti-de´tente Committee on
the Present Danger (CPD) in the late 1970s, Samuel Huntington observed,
“When deep concern and deep knowledge are combined, they can be an
important influence in the American policymaking process.”1 During the Cold
War, the idea that theWest could not coexist with the Soviet Union and instead
must “roll back” or “liberate” it, was initially popular in U.S. policymaking
circles. However, by the early 1970s even the mainstream of U.S. conservatives
had accepted the de´tente in U.S.-Soviet relations.2 This article argues that
the resurrection of hardline anti-Communism in the mid-to-late 1970s was
directly related to an epistemic community that had developed over previous
decades. Commentators often referred to this community as the “Soviet threat”
or “Cold War” lobby, and it consisted of tough-minded experts in such fields
1. Samuel P. Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., The Making of America’s
Soviet Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 276–277.
2. Francis H. Marlo, Planning Reagan’s War: Conservative Strategists and America’s Cold War Victory
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), pp. 37–70. For a brief discussion of Ronald Reagan’s
“transformation” of U.S. Cold War strategy, at least prior to Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power, see
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of American National Security Policy
during the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 349–362. Gaddis depicts
Reagan as being personally responsible for promoting a hardline worldview and downplays the CPD’s
influence except on arms control (pp. 351–352). Gaddis’s analysis is flawed in two respects . . First, the
ideas he attributes to Reagan were hardly original and were not very different from the views held by
other officials in the Reagan administration, most of whom were part of the same intellectual milieu.
Thus, rather than crediting Reagan with these ideas, my analysis here examines the broader intellectual
milieu of which he was a part. Second, the CPD may have focused on arms control, but one can
scarcely disassociate their views on this issue from their broader ideological views and assumptions
about the Soviet Union. This broader perspective was a prominent aspect of the hardline arguments
they promoted.
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as U.S. national security policy, strategic studies, Soviet studies, and arms
control. Moreover, the community extended well beyond the membership of
the CPD and included an important international component. One of the
key individuals responsible for creating and sustaining this community was
Frank R. Barnett. Recognizing the limits of government-sponsored activities
in prosecuting a more aggressive strategy to counter the Soviet Union, he
sidestepped U.S. officialdom and created a parallel and less-constrained private
network to engage in a “war of ideas” both at home and abroad. From the end
of World War II to the demise of the Soviet Union, he took upon himself the
crucial role of linking foundation money with ideas and building a network
to transmit those ideas. Within the Cold Warrior “fraternity,” Barnett’s efforts
were highly regarded, although thus far they have received little scholarly
attention, particularly compared to the activities of the well-known CPD.3
The methodology Barnett developed for promoting an anti-Soviet agenda
was qualitatively different from that of mainstreamColdWarriors. It was pred-
icated, ironically, on Leninist ideas of cadre organization and the need for a
generational outlook. Barnett set about developing networks and educational
fora for policymakers, lawmakers, industrialists, reserve officers, and scholars.
With the financial backing of private foundations, Barnett helped create the
Institute for American Strategy (IAS) and later founded the National Strategy
Information Center (NSIC). Unlike most think tanks and public policy insti-
tutes that aim to inform policymaking through their scholarly activities, IAS
and NSIC were primarily designed to serve as focal points and clearing houses
for waging the Cold War. Barnett used these institutions as a mechanism to
shape public and elite discourse, including by supporting programs to educate
the next generation of scholars in such fields as strategic studies and intelligence
studies. Furthermore, he internationalized these activities, thus developing a
global network of scholars and anti-Communist elites who would not only
influence policy in their individual countries, but also provide a mutually sup-
porting system across borders. Arguably the most notable achievement of this
network was that it kept the ideology of hardline anti-Communism on the
“back burner” during a period when the mainstream discourse of “peaceful
coexistence” and “de´tente” prevailed. However, when political circumstances
changed, particularly in themid-to-late 1970s, this ideologymade a comeback.
3. No study of Barnett has yet been attempted. Nor does he feature in any mainstream works on U.S.
anti-Communism. At most, he is mentioned in passing or as a minor footnote. This lack of interest is,
perhaps, as it should be, for Barnett did not seek high office and was content to operate mainly behind
the scenes. Although often treated as a “star” by many of the most important officials in the country,
he was relatively unknown outside elite circles.
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Its revival would never have been feasible if Barnett had not helped to ensure
its survival during the “wilderness years.”
The lack of attention to Barnett’s activities within the field of Cold War
studies can probably be attributed to a more traditional reluctance of scholars
to appreciate the importance of private-sector individuals and groups, as well
as epistemic communities, in the making of foreign policy. In recent years,
though, historians and political scientists have increasingly taken account of
the role played by philanthropic foundations, think tanks, citizen groups, and
“state-private” networks, and this article seeks to contribute to the emerging
literature.4 Among the key points these scholars have highlighted is the crucial
linkage between ideas and their transmission through epistemic communities.
In some instances, a concept is already popular and therefore in a dominant po-
sition in the “marketplace of ideas.” In other instances, the idea must overcome
opposition before it becomes respectable. The role of an epistemic commu-
nity consisting of acknowledged experts on a given subject can be essential in
transforming an idea from the margins to the mainstream of policymakers’
worldviews and discourse. When these experts are organized, well-funded, and
have respectable outlets to express their views to an audience that is willing to
listen, they can make a considerable political impact.5 Given Barnett’s integral
role in providing the organization, funds, and respectable outlets for the Cold
Warrior “fraternity,” a study of his activities can shed important light on how
this group was able to attains such far-reaching influence on U.S. policy.
Although a good deal of scholarship addresses the role of informational,
cultural, and other non-military activities employed to wage the Cold War,
there are still important gaps in this literature, especially in its coverage of
“state-private” networks.6 The existing literature tends to focus on the state’s
manipulation of the private sector to realize its Cold War aims, rather than
the other way around. Consequently, research in the field has not dealt much
4. For a small sample of this voluminous literature, see Kimberly Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The
Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009);
Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); and Inderjeet Parmar, “Foundation Networks and American
Hegemony,” European Journal of American Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 1–24.
5. Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue-area.” See: Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and
International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), p. 3.
6. Several examples of this literature include Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, eds., The U.S. Gov-
ernment, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network (London: Routledge, 2006),
pp. 13–28; Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York:
New York University Press, 1999); and Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the
Cultural Cold War (London: Granta Books, 1999).
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with private-sector efforts to mobilize, promote, and sustain national and
international anti-Communist coalitions for the purpose of “rolling back” the
Soviet “empire,” an objective that was distinctly at odds with the official policy
of “containment” and “de´tente.”
One exception to this shortcoming in the literature has been the study
of the CPD. Extant accounts of the CPD convey a misleading impression;
namely, that the 1970s “growth industry” of publicizing the Soviet threat came
out of thin air.7 But in fact one cannot appreciate the rise of the “hardline”
epistemic community, of which theCPDwas perhaps themost visible element,
without taking into account the less visible Cold War activism of Barnett
over the previous two decades. His activism was at least as important as the
CPD’s efforts in promoting the anti-de´tente agenda, though the activities
of the two were complementary rather than conflictual. The founding head
of the CPD, Eugene Rostow, wrote that the new organization’s activities
would be “comparable [to] if more limited ” than Barnett’s activities.8 Such a
characterization demonstrates the esteem in which Rostow held Barnett—a
view shared by others in the community of Cold Warriors. Barnett’s impact
as a promoter of an anti-Communist “hidden curriculum” in relation to both
civilian and military education, although impossible to measure, is particularly
noteworthy.9 The impact of a “hidden curriculum” is difficult to quantify, but
this does not prevent it from being a legitimate subject of analysis. At the very
least, the time, money, and effort expended in promoting this approach to the
7. Although the original CPD was prominent in the 1950s and then declined, the discussion of the
CPD in this article refers only to the group that formed in the mid-1970s. For more information
on both groups, see Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the
Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983). Unfortunately, Sanders’s account examines
the CPD in isolation from other groups, particularly those that maintained the “hardline” discourse
during the “wilderness years” of the 1960s through the mid-1970s. The same limitation is present in
critical studies of the “Team B” controversy. See, for instance, Anne Hessing Cahn and John Prados,
“Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993, pp. 23–27.
Another useful study of the backgrounds and influence of four hardliners prominent in the Reagan
administration is Jay Winik, On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and
the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). However, Winik’s
study fails to examine the broader intellectual milieu in which these individuals existed.
8. Rostow to Barnett, 1 June 1976, in Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) Papers, Box 284,
Hoover Institute Archives (HIA), Stanford University, Stanford, CA; emphasis added.
9. Although there is no evidence that Barnett ever used the term “hidden curriculum,” its use here
is deliberate. Scholars typically use this term in relation to the socializing and ideological impact of
education, and it often refers specifically to classroom practices and relationships. Nevertheless, it is an
appropriate term to use in relation to Barnett, and I use it here to describe how he facilitated funding
for the teaching of topics such as “arms control,” “strategic studies,” and “intelligence studies” with
the expectation that these subjects would promote a particular worldview, especially about threats and
ways of countering them. The students, and possibly the teachers as well, were not necessarily aware of
this agenda. For examples of how the term is used, see Fulya Damla Kentli, “Comparison of Hidden
Curriculum Theories,” European Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 83–88.
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communication of ideas demonstrates that those who sponsored it believed
it had a major impact. The same was true of political figures who opposed
the hardline agenda. They worried that the “hidden curriculum” would shape
public policy, and they therefore were vocal in denouncing it.
This article provides an overview of Barnett’s activism and its impact on
the development of an epistemic community of Cold Warriors. The article is
divided into five sections. The first section examines Barnett’s background and
highlights the origins of his thinking on the importance and organizational
methods of waging a “war of ideas.” The second section discusses how Barnett
refined his methods and approach in the 1950s and became a key figure in the
Cold Warrior community, particularly after receiving philanthropic backing.
This section also shows how Barnett formed a network of like-minded and
respected hardliners, many of whom later became prominent in the 1970s
anti-de´tente movement. Third, it investigates how Barnett played a crucial
role in expanding and institutionalizing this network during the 1960s and
early 1970s. The fourth section focuses on the important part he played in
the 1970s in helping to undermine de´tente and his later efforts to support
the Reagan administration. The final section discusses Barnett’s international
activities, specifically his efforts to create a mutually supporting transnational
network.
The Education of a Cold War Activist
A brief look at Barnett’s background is essential to set the stage for under-
standing his ideological motivation and the origins of the methodology he
employed during the rest of his career to promote his Cold War views. Born
in 1921 in Chillicothe, Ohio, Barnett began his career as a Cold War activist
during the final days of World War II when he was serving as a corporal in
the 69th Infantry Division. Because the U.S. Army had previously sent him to
study Russian at Syracuse University, he served as an interpreter when his unit
met up with the Soviet Army on the Elbe in 1945. During this period, Barnett
was involved with the repatriation of Soviet prisoners who had been captured
by the Germans. Many of these Soviet prisoners had begged to stay in the
West, knowing that they would be harshly treated by the Soviet authorities
if they returned to the USSR. As Barnett later recounted, the experience of
sending many of these prisoners to certain death or imprisonment haunted
him and helped to clarify the stakes of the Cold War.10
10. “Tribute to Frank R. Barnett by R. Daniel McMichael,” Washington, DC, 20 October 1994, in
the private collection of R. Daniel McMichael.
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In 1945–1946, Barnett finished his military service and briefly served as
a public information official attached to the staff of General Lucius Clay, who
was then heading the U.S. occupation of Germany. A year later, Barnett moved
to the United Kingdom as a Rhodes Scholar based at Oxford University. Most
likely Oxford was where he became familiar with the works of Vladimir Lenin.
Although Barnett had an aversion to Communism as a political ideology, he
was impressed by how the ideology spread.11 The key lesson he derived was
that for Lenin, Communism was not simply an idea or philosophy; more
importantly, it was a “power technique” and a triumph of organization. In
Barnett’s eyes, Lenin’s great achievement was the way the once exiled and
unemployed lawyer, who was “confined to a rented room in Zurich,” was able
to change the course of history.12 Lenin succeeded through a combination of
organization and education, which required forming a “vanguard” of dedicated
activists to spread and institutionalize Communist ideas.13 Throughout his
later life as a Cold War activist, Barnett would regularly cite Lenin’s 1902
pamphlet What Is to Be Done? as a model on which anti-Communists could
pattern their strategy. Indeed, the epistemic community of hardline anti-
Communists that he would play a meaningful role in fostering over the next
several decades took its cue from his reading of Lenin.
Following his stint at Oxford, Barnett returned to the United States in
1949 and became an assistant professor of English at Wabash College in
Indiana. Although teaching was his main job, he also became involved in part-
time work aiding refugees from Soviet-controlled areas. Through this work
Barnett made initial contact with key figures in the burgeoning community
of Cold Warriors. In 1951, Barnett was introduced to a former operative
in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), William Casey, who had gone on
to work with the International Rescue Committee. Barnett also met former
OSS head William “Wild Bill” Donovan. Both Casey and Donovan were
working to support refugees and encourage defections from the Eastern bloc.14
Taking leave fromWabash College, Barnett helped Casey and Donovan found
American Friends for Russian Freedom and became its executive director. This
organization, which lasted for several years, aimed to get “Red Army personnel
in Berlin andVienna to desert, to get thempapers, find them jobs, resettle them
11. Richard Shultz, interview,Washington, DC, 17November 2011; and Robert Pfaltzgraff, interview,
Washington, DC, 17 November 2011.
12. Frank R. Barnett, “What Is to Be Done?” in Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, eds., American
Strategy for the Nuclear Age (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1960), p. 455.
13. Ibid., pp. 440–441, 455.
14. Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking, 1990), p. 128.
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in the West, and make propaganda hay out of their defections.”15 Barnett also
helped to promote and fundraise for the Tolstoy Foundation, an organization
that assisted escapees from Soviet-controlled areas.16
In 1951, Barnett produced a pamphlet titled Cold War, Atomic War or
Free Slavic Legion.17 He distributed it to politicians in Washington such as
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Congressman Charles J. Kersten.18 The
pamphlet particularly impressed Kersten, who placed its entire text into the
Congressional Record.19 In the pamphlet, Barnett called for the United States to
establish military units of Iron Curtain refugees, which he dubbed the “Free
Slavic Legion.” Consisting of approximately five divisions and headed at the
staff level by U.S. commanders but with refugee line officers, this unit would
be based in West Germany. In the event of war, the unit could be airlifted
behind Soviet lines where it would be invaluable in the establishment and
support of underground movements carrying on a guerrilla war against the
Soviet Union. The “Free Slavic Legion” plan also called for U.S. recognition
of the governments-in-exile of countries under Soviet control, the adoption of
full-scale psychological warfare, and an end to all East-West negotiations.20
Among the other recipients of Barnett’s pamphlet in the summer of
1951 were two New York investment bankers, Frank A. Willard and Clifford
Roberts. Both were friends and golfing companions of General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, who was then serving as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.21
Willard forwarded the pamphlet to Eisenhower. Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower
replied: “It certainly looks to me like there is a great deal of sense in the
15. “Tribute to Frank R. Barnett by R. Daniel McMichael.”
16. Frank Barnett, “America’s Strategic Weakness—Redefection,” Russian Review, Vol. 15, No. 1
(January 1956), pp. 29–36. For background on the Tolstoy Foundation, see Paul B. Anderson, “The
Tolstoy Foundation,” The Russian Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1958), pp. 60–66.
17. Willard Edwards, “Study: U.S. Plan for Promoting Undergrounds; Prof. Barnett Drafts Aid for
Anti-Reds,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 21 April 1951, p. 11.
18. Barnett to Douglas, 8 February 1951, in Henry Cabot Lodge II Papers, Legislative Subject Files,
Box 39, Massachusetts Historical Society.
19. At this time, Kersten successfully proposed an amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 that
allowed the expenditure of $100million from the 1952 defense budget to aid the enlistment of escapees
and refugees from Soviet-dominated countries “into elements of the military forces supporting the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes when it is determined . . . that such assistance
will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area.”
20. Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: NATO and the Campaign of 1952,
Vol. XII, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 454–455.
21. I have been unable to ascertain precisely how Barnett first came across Willard and Roberts. Most
likely the connection derived either from one of Barnett’s acquaintances or possibly those of Donovan
or Casey, both of whom were well connected socially.
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whole idea if the practical problems implicit in it can be solved.”22 Eisenhower
subsequently sent the pamphlet to “officials inWashingtonwhohave to dowith
this kind of enterprise” and instructed his staff at the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe to study it.23 Among the “officials in Washington” with
whom Eisenhower discussed Barnett’s plan was the deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Allen Dulles, who agreed to discuss the
plan with Barnett in person. Following a meeting with Dulles on 17 August,
Barnett was instructed to prepare a memorandum for review by Gordon Gray,
director of the Psychological Strategy Board.24
In late September, Eisenhower wrote to Roberts, “I understand that Mr.
Barnett has already been asked by Washington to submit a detailed memoran-
dum for consideration by the officials in theDefenseDepartment.”25 Although
Eisenhower noted, “There have been quite a number of plans similar to that
one advanced by Barnett,” he also observed, “I think it is always possible that
he has a better idea than any other that has been advanced.”26 Eisenhower
discussed Barnett’s proposal with Army Chief of Staff General Joseph Lawton
Collins and Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith.27 However,
the feedback he received highlighted the political and practical complications
inherent in Barnett’s proposal. Eisenhower asked Willard to convey to Barnett
that, if any action was taken, it would have to be delayed for “at least the
next six to eight months.”28 Yet Eisenhower also wanted to reassure Barnett
that “I am having the staff here study the entire question of utilization of
anti-Communist persons and groups.”29
In the following years, Barnett maintained an ongoing dialogue on this
issue with Dulles and other policymakers. These officials were ideologically
22. Eisenhower to Willard, 1 August 1951, in Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
p. 454.
23. Ibid.; and “Editor’s Note,” in Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, p. 455.
24. For a general overview of other U.S. efforts around this time to mobilize Iron Curtain defectors
and refugees, see Lucas, Freedom’s War.
25. Eisenhower to Roberts, 27 September 1951, in Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David
Eisenhower, p. 575.
26. Ibid., p. 576.
27. Eisenhower toWillard, 18October 1951, inGalambos, ed.,The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,
pp. 654–655.
28. Barnett had discussed his proposal with Army Chief of Staff Collins before the latter’s departure for
Europe to meet with Eisenhower in October. Collins explained that although he realized “the resistance
potential of the proposed force, he believed that the US Army had no authority to recruit a foreign
legion and that the task might better be the responsibility of NATO forces.” Ibid., p. 655.
29. Ibid.
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sympathetic but were ultimately noncommittal.30 Although the ideas of
Barnett and others about forming a military unit consisting of refugees came
to the fore during the Eisenhower administration and later be referred to as
the “Volunteer Freedom Corps,” they were never put into practice.31 Even so,
Barnett’s early Cold War activities in this area make clear that he was able to
communicate his ideas directly to senior policymakers despite being an un-
known junior professor from aMidwestern college. Perhaps more importantly,
the connections he developed with senior officials, as well as his growing
reputation within the ColdWarrior community, were crucial to his subsequent
efforts to expand exponentially his anti-Soviet activities from a relatively small
focus on assisting Soviet e´migre´s to the waging of a full-blown “war of ideas.”
Forming a Vanguard
Not until the mid-1950s did Barnett have his first major opportunity to
put into action some of his earlier Leninist concepts about achieving polit-
ical change. At this time, Barnett was introduced to H. Smith Richardson,
Sr., whose family ran the philanthropic Richardson Foundation (later Smith
Richardson). The two of them shared similar views about the nature of the
Soviet threat, and Barnett persuaded Richardson of the political impact foun-
dation funding could have in promoting these views on a national scale. Im-
pressed by Barnett’s ideas, Richardson appointed him the foundation’s research
director in 1955.32
As research director, with access to considerable funding, Barnett was
ideally placed to promote his ideas about the Cold War, mainly through the
channeling of subsidies to like-minded individuals and groups. The key idea
Barnett was propagating at this time was the need to wage “political warfare”
against the Soviet Union. Apart from efforts to raise awareness about the Soviet
threat specifically, Barnett advocated the study of geopolitics and strategy more
generally. In his view, studying these subjects would cultivate amindset inclined
toward competition with the Soviet Union and would encourage individuals
to enter government service, where they could have an influence on policy.
Another key theme Barnett promoted was the need for bipartisan consensus.
30. Barnett to Dulles, 21 April 1952; Dulles to Barnes, 30 April 1952; and Barnett to Dulles, 14
December 1953, in CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives II, College Park, MD.
31. James Jay Carafano, “Mobilizing Europe’s Stateless: America’s Plan for a Cold War Army,” Journal
of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 61–85.
32. R. Daniel McMichael, interview, Washington, DC, 17 November 2011.
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He felt that McCarthyism and the increasingly polarized politics of the period
undermined the U.S. position on the international stage. As such, waging the
Cold War more effectively meant promoting a non-partisan environment in
which U.S. citizens in the political mainstream could engage in a dialogue
about national strategy and have “rational” discussions about Communism.33
Although Barnett worked for Richardson, he found the philanthropist’s
views to be simplistic. To secure funding from Richardson, he would advise
his preferred grant applicants on the best means to demonstrate the value of
their work.34 Two key relationships he developed during this period became
increasingly important in the ensuing decades. The first was with William
Kintner and Robert Strausz-Hupe´ of the Foreign Policy Research Institute
(FPRI).35 Barnett was able to supply funding for FPRI, and the think tank
generated ideas on how to wage the Cold War, which he then assisted in
disseminating.36 Barnett and Strausz-Hupe´ held similar ideas, most notably
their views of Communism as a doctrine and technique of conflict and the
necessity for professional revolutionaries to be in the “vanguard.”37 They also
agreed on the need for a geopolitically informed government strategy and
on the requirement for geopolitics to be part of the educational curricula
for military personnel. Shortly after FPRI’s founding, and with the support
of the Richardson Foundation, the institute began a study of the concept
of “protracted conflict.” In 1959, the completed study was published as a
book of the same name. As Strausz-Hupe´ states in the book’s preface: “It is
to be hoped that this book will help establish a conceptual consensus among
American policymaking groups and opinion elites on the protean nature of
the Communist challenge.”38 Subsequently, the book was used as a key text in
the seminars Barnett helped to organize in the years ahead.
The second key relationship was with R. Daniel McMichael, later an
aide to the conservative philanthropist Richard Mellon Scaife. Barnett and
McMichael first met in 1955 while collaborating on a three-day National
33. Ibid.
34. Barnett to Kintner, 10 October 1960, in William R. Kintner (WRK) Papers, Box 67, Folder 5,
HIA.
35. FPRI was founded in early 1955 and based at the University of Pennsylvania. Other FPRI staff and
associates with whom Barnett developed relationships included Stefan Possony and Robert Pfaltzgraff.
36. Andrew Crampton and Gearo´id O´ Tuathai, “Intellectuals, Institutions and Ideology: The Case
of Robert Strauss-Hupe and ‘American Geopolitics,’” Political Geography, Vol. 15, No. 6/7 (July–
September 1996), pp. 533–555. Barnett supported FPRI and its scholars for many years. When
Pfaltzgraff left FPRI in the late 1970s to create the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Barnett
assisted with its funding.
37. Pfaltzgraff, interview.
38. Robert Strausz-Hupe´ et al., Protracted Conflict (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. xiv.
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Military-Industrial Conference (NMIC) in Chicago.39 The annual NMIC
meetings, which began that year and lasted until 1961, attracted roughly
1,000 “military officials, representatives of federal agencies, executives from
defense corporations, scientists, strategic intellectuals, spokesmen for conser-
vative foundations, publishers, and veterans groups.”40 Rather than concentrate
on military-technical issues, Barnett persuaded the conference organizers to
focus the agenda on “geopolitics, defense, and policy imperatives concerning
the Cold War.”41 Impressed by Barnett’s ability as an activist, McMichael was
eager to join forces with him, and the two became close friends.42 Through
McMichael, Barnett developed long-standing linkswith the Scaife Foundation.
Dulles approved CIA officials to attend the NMICmeetings and in September
1960 sought Barnett’s help to assist with promoting anti-Communism in the
U.S. education system. Such was the close social and ideological relationship
they developed over the preceding years that Barnett ensured that Dulles’s
proposal became the topic of the April 1961 conference.43
One of the byproducts of the NMIC was an agreement by its organizers
to implement plans for a “permanent year-round program” to “awaken the
public to the all-encompassing nature of the Soviet Communist challenge.”44
This effort to engage the public was achieved, in part, through the setting up
of an institute or, as Barnett described it, a “traveling civilian war college.”45
In 1958, Barnett helped create the IAS and served as its programs director.
The primary means of IAS engagement with the public was by conducting
seminars on Cold War topics around the country. Whereas the work of the
FPRI formed the intellectual basis for Barnett’s anti-Communist message, the
IAS, through the organization of meetings and seminars, acted as a means to
39. Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, “School for Strategy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March
1961, p. 105.
40. Dolores E. Janiewski, “Eisenhower’s Paradoxical Relationship with the ‘Military-Industrial Com-
plex,’” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (December 2011), p. 669.
41. “Frank Rockwell Barnett: Remarks by R. Daniel McMichael,” National War College, Fort Leslie
J. McNair, Washington, DC, 30 September 1993, in McMichael private collection.
42. McMichael, interview.
43. Dulles to Barnett, 21 September 1960; Barnett to Dulles, 8 February 1961; Dulles to Barnett, 25
February 1961; Dulles to Barnett, 13 July 1961; and Barnett to Dulles, 10 July 1961. Evidence of
Barnett’s relationship to Dulles prior to this period can be found in Barnett to Dulles, 13 December
1957; Dulles to Barnett, 8 February 1958; Barnett to Dulles, 15 January 1958; and Dulles to Barnett,
20 March 1959. Each of these letters is available in CIA, CREST.
44. Lyons and Morton, “School for Strategy,” p. 105; and “Back School of Strategy to Compete in
Cold War,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 7 April 1959, p. 9.
45. Frank R. Barnett, “A Proposal for Political Warfare,” Military Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 March 1961,
p. 4.
80
The Cold War Activism of Frank R. Barnett
communicate this message to the public.46 As Barnett later noted: “The rather
passive business of conducting seminars, studying strategy, and steeping the
mind in the operational techniques of communism may strike some practical
men of affairs as a waste of time. Yet effective action does flow from doctrine,
doctrine so thoroughly absorbed that it guides the intuition and governs
the reflex of statecraft.”47 The IAS also had an important capacity-building
function, providing materials and support to regional organizations as well as
advice on how to fundraise locally and spread the message.48
Over the next several years, the IAS emerged as a leading anti-Communist
organization with high-profile connections in both the public and private
sector. For instance, in July 1960, the IAS held a meeting in Washington, DC,
to discuss its future activities. The key themediscussedwas howbest to promote
the notion that U.S. ColdWar strategy had to be offensive rather than defensive.
The meeting’s list of participants is notable. In addition to Barnett and other
senior IAS and FPRI members, they included senior officials in the military,
State Department, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).49 The minutes
of the meeting make clear that all participants shared a hardline outlook. The
only issue being debated was the most effective means of promoting their
message.
Throughout this period, Barnett urged the establishment of a “Cold War
University” to train business executives, educators, politicians, and military
personnel in techniques appropriate to wage the Cold War.50 Despite the lack
of any official interest in this idea, Barnett nonetheless came close to putting it
into practice. An important milestone in his career as a Cold War activist, and
one that gained him some public notoriety, came in the late 1950s, when he
persuaded the U.S. military to create a two-week course at the National War
College for Reserve and National Guard officers. This was made possible by
a National Security Council (NSC) directive issued in early 1958 stating that
46. Lyons and Morton, “School for Strategy,” p. 105. The most comprehensive history of FPRI makes
no mention of Barnett or of its role in the National War College seminars, though it does make a
passing reference to the Richardson Foundation as an early source of funding. See Howard J. Wiarda,
Think Tanks and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Research Institute and Presidential Politics (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books, 2010).
47. Barnett in Hahn and Neff, eds., American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, p. 454.
48. Barnett to Chamberlain, 7 November 1960, in WRK Papers, Box 67, Folder 5, HIA.
49. The participants included, among others, Lieutenant General Arthur Trudeau, Admiral Chester
Ward, General Charles Bonesteel III, William C. Sullivan (FBI), William H. Sullivan (State Depart-
ment), Kintner, Strausz-Hupe´, and Stefan Possony. See Draft Summary of Remarks Made during IAS
Meeting at National War College, 22 July 1960, in WRK Papers, Box 67, Folder 5, HIA.
50. George Bartlett, “Convention Here Hears Retired General: Importance of Reservists Stressed,” St.
Petersburg Times, 19 May 1957, p. 5-B.
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U.S. government policy was “to make use of military personnel and facilities
to arouse the public to the menace of Communism.”51
Among the contacts Barnett had developed was Rear Admiral William
Mott.52 In 1958, Mott introduced Barnett to the U.S. chief of naval opera-
tions, Admiral Arleigh Burke. This introduction was the start of a long-term
partnership between the two. In May 1958, Burke created an advisory panel,
the purpose of which was to stimulate ideas about raising awareness within
the Navy about the Cold War. Burke’s panel recommended that naval officers
pattern their public statements on Barnett’s speeches. In September, Barnett
discussed with Burke the possibility of using the facilities of the National
War College, which closed its doors during the summer, to run a Cold War
seminar in a format similar to the one used for the NMIC. Barnett argued
that the 25,000 Reserve and National Guard officers who in civilian life were
educators, lawyers, media professionals, advertising and public relations exec-
utives, business and labor leaders, and members of local or state governments,
represented an ideal source for disseminating Cold War ideas throughout the
United States.53
The topics Barnett wanted the officers to cover as part of a two-week cram
course included Soviet grand strategy; the military balance in Europe and
the Pacific; the geopolitics of the Middle East; Leninist tactics in insurgency,
disinformation and ideological warfare, and the theory and practice of arms
control.54 Following the course, the officers would be encouraged to return
home and lecture, write, debate in civic forums, and organize local seminars
on international security topics for civilian groups. The audience Barnett
principally sought to influence and mobilize through these seminars was what
he referred to as the “gray area.” This audience consisted of intelligent and
reasonable laymen in the political mainstream who were not “literate” about
national security affairs.55 Admiral Burke noted the basic purpose of the two-
week summer course would be “to train cadres of citizen-soldiers who are active
in civic and public affairs and who can, through their positions in civilian life,
help create a resolute national climate of opinion. . . . This will strengthen
51. This memorandum and related correspondence can be found in the Congressional Record—Senate,
2 August 1961, pp. 14,433–14,439.
52. In 1960, Mott became the Navy’s judge advocate general.
53. Lori LynBogle,The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind (College Station: Texas A&MUniversity
Press, 2004), p. 140.
54. Eugene Methvin, “League to Save Carthage—The Scripture and the Saints,” remarks made in
Wintergreen, VA, April 1988, in McMichael private collection.
55. McMichael, interview.
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national defense programs and bolster the national will to resist communist
peace and propaganda stratagems.”56
Because the U.S. military had not appropriated funds for this activity,
Barnett and the Richardson Foundation offered to cover the expenses. To
teach the course, known as the “Defense Strategy Seminar,” Barnett turned
to the FPRI for assistance.57 The course was initially based on Strausz-Hupe´’s
Protracted Conflict, though a separate book was developed by the IAS and
FPRI titled American Strategy for the Nuclear Age.58 This publication was to
serve as a textbook that would give seminar participants background readings
in geopolitics, propaganda analysis, Communist ideology, and history.59 It also
included a final chapter written by Barnett titled “What Is to Be Done?” in
which he laid out a program of action for engaging in “political warfare.”60
Apart from the FPRI staff, lectures were given by well-known personalities in
the national security field such as Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, Maxwell
Taylor, and Dulles. The first seminar, held in July 1959, was attended by “218
reserve officers (representing all branches of the armed services as well as the 50
states and Puerto Rico), 2 governors, 3 congressmen, 70 educators, and over
40 members of the media from newspapers, radio and television.”61 Among
the officers with whom Barnett became acquainted through these seminars
was John Marsh, then a National Guard officer and later Army Secretary
under President Ronald Reagan. Barnett also developed a close association
with Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, the summer school commandant
of the war college.62
The NationalWar College seminars quickly expanded into a series of local
seminars IAS organized throughout the country, of which more than 25 were
held by 1961.63 As part of the IAS effort to “spread the word,” the institute
distributed some 10,000 copies of American Strategy for the Nuclear Age to
56. Burke cited in Bogle, The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind, pp. 143–144.
57. This course was later renamed the “National Strategy Seminar.”
58. Hahn and Neff, eds., American Strategy for the Nuclear Age. See also Walter F. Hahn, letter to the
editor, with reply by Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1961,
pp. 255–256.
59. Lyons and Morton, “School for Strategy,” p. 103.
60. Barnett in Hahn and Neff, eds., American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, pp. 440–455.
61. Ibid., xviii.
62. Pfaltzgraff, interview
63. For instance, seminars were organized in New York, Cleveland, New Orleans, and Wilmington,
North Carolina, as well as in California, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington, DC. See Lyons and
Morton, “School for Strategy,” p. 103. According to Barnett, “During these two-day Seminars (usually
on Friday and Saturday) six to eight experts analyze the threat we face from world communism,
counterstrategies for the US are discussed by a panel and from the floor. Proposals for civic education,
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public school libraries and debate groups throughout the country. Barnett also
became a “frequent lecturer to the National War College, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, the Army and Naval war colleges . . . the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, and the Reserve Officers Association.”64 Much as he
had influenced the NMIC agenda, Barnett pushed the National Association
of Manufacturers away from industry-centered discussions at their meetings
in favor of Cold War topics.65
A key theme of Barnett’s lectureswas the need to avoid domestic infighting.
He was quoted as arguing that “only communists gain by Americans libelling
each other as ‘pinkos’ and ‘appeasers.’”66 Nevertheless, one of the key problems
that emerged with the National War College seminars was that they occurred
against the backdrop of increasing fears that far-right groups such as the
John Birch Society were attempting to indoctrinate the U.S. military with
their “extreme” views. In July 1961, Senator J. William Fulbright sent a
memorandum to President John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert
S. McNamara titled “Propaganda Activities of Military Personnel Directed at
the Public.” Fulbright singled out the activities of the IAS and FPRI in his
criticism, warning that their activities and their “particularly aggressive view” of
Communism might seriously hinder domestic and foreign policies. Moreover,
he complained, “Basic material . . . under the title of American Strategy for
the Nuclear Age, prepared and disseminated by private organizations with
close military connections . . . can be said to be contrary to the President’s
program.”67 Fulbright’s memorandum was leaked to the press and put the
spotlight on Barnett as the guiding force behind the seminars.68
Even though Fulbright looked dimly on Barnett’s educational activities,
several important voices spoke up in his defense. Among these was a Life
Magazine editorial, reportedly written by C. D. Jackson, the magazine’s editor
and a former Eisenhower administration official responsible for managingU.S.
“psychological warfare.” The editorial stated,
research, curriculum improvement for schools, and in-plant training by corporations also are considered
under the heading of ‘What can be done by the private citizen?’” Barnett, “A Proposal for Political
Warfare,” p. 6.
64. Lyons and Morton, “School for Strategy,” p. 105.
65. McMichael, interview.
66. Peter Kihss, “Anti-Red Seminar Held by N.A.M.: FBI Aide Says 300,000 Spies Are World Threat,”
The New York Times, 8December 1961, p. 28. See also “Crackpot for Reds Scored: FoundationOfficial
Advises Reservists on Seminars,” The New York Times, 5 September 1961, p. 11.
67. Congressional Record—Senate, 2 August 1961, pp. 14,433–14,439.
68. Herman S. Wolk, “The Case against Our Armed Forces,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 44, No. 12
(December 1961), pp. 34–38.
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If Barnett’s brand of anti-Communism were as dangerous as Fulbright seems to
fear we would be lost indeed. But the opposite is the case. The danger is rather
that because crackpots and witch-hunters are often found in and around the
anti-Communist movement, all attempts to study and fight the Cold War will
be lumped together and opposed en bloc by faculty club liberals who don’t like
warriors of any kind, hot or cold.69
Likewise, although the FPRI was “lumped together” with the anti-Communist
political right, the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell observed: “The Strausz-
Hupe´ group is neither part of, nor should it be identified with, the lunatic
fringes of the right. Its arguments are serious and subject to the debate and
rival assessments of other scholars.”70
After receiving Fulbright’s memorandum, McNamara appointed a com-
mittee to investigate his complaints about troop information programs and
anti-Communist indoctrination. Curiously, the committee members McNa-
mara selected to investigate this issue were mostly hardliners and included
several of Barnett’s acquaintances. Among these was the committee’s head,
Karl Bendetsen, a former undersecretary of the Army, who later served on
the board of NSIC. Burke and Dulles also served on the committee.71 In
the aftermath of the controversy, both the IAS and FPRI were barred from
involvement with the seminars, at least from an institutional perspective, and
the war college even went so far as to remove Protracted Conflict from the
syllabus.72 Nevertheless, links with individuals working for the IAS and FPRI
remained intact, and Barnett continued to be a member of the seminar faculty
until 1967.
Developing an Epistemic Community
Despite the setback with the summer seminars, Barnett continued to pursue
ways of encouraging voluntary partnerships between the armed forces and
69. “Crackpots: How They Help Communism, ‘Superpatriots’ Are Not Needed to Win Cold War,”
Life Magazine, 1 December 1961, p. 6.
70. Daniel Bell, “The Dispossessed—1962,” in Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right (New York: Dou-
bleday, 1963), pp. 4–5.
71. Jack Raymond, “Panel to Assess Troop Education: Burke and Dulles among 13 Selected by
McNamara to Evaluate Indoctrination,” The New York Times, 10 January 1962, p. 1; and Hanson
W. Baldwin, “Troop Information: Purpose and Scope of Education Plan Called Essential Function of
Command,” The New York Times, 12 January 1962, p. 7.
72. Kintner to Barnett, 21 June 1962, in WRK Papers, Box 68, Folder 1, HIA; and Gene M. Lyons
and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 119.
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the private sector, and of disseminating his anti-Communist agenda.73 During
the latter period in which Barnett was organizing the war college seminars,
he decided to institutionalize his connections with like-minded officers by
forming the League to Save Carthage. This group initially consisted of several
of the alumni from the 1959 seminar. The reference to Carthage derived from
General Armstrong, a classics enthusiast who later wrote a book about the
Third PunicWar replete with numerous ColdWar themes.74 Described as both
“whimsical” and a “classic case history of voluntary civil-military partnership,”
the League to Save Carthage eventually consisted of nearly 100 individuals.75
Approximately once every twelve to eighteen months the group convened for
a few days in a workshop to receive expert briefings, discuss changes in Soviet
strategy and tactics, and devise practical ways to counter them.76 One of the
League’s members, David Abshire, referred to it as “an eclectic ad-hoc group of
leading citizens” who consulted with each other on ColdWar issues.77 Barnett,
who was known as “Hamilcar,” headed the League, which in effect meant
organizing the meetings at his own initiative. League members, all known as
“field marshals,” included Abshire, Burke, Scaife, McMichael, Marsh, Casey,
and numerous other prominent individuals, the majority of whom were from
the United States, although the League also consisted of some ten foreigners.78
According to Barnett, the League’s membership included
Liberal conservatives and conservative liberals. . . . The League takes no position
on internal social, religious, economic, tax or welfare policies. It seeks only to
enlist Republicans and Democrats, Tories and Social Democrats (and their like),
73. See, for instance, Barnett, “A Proposal for Political Warfare,” p. 3.
74. Donald Armstrong, The Reluctant Warriors (New York: Krowell Publishing, 1966). In the book’s
preface, Armstrong states, “The Roman pattern of conquest has a startling relevance for our own
time. For more than forty years prior to the final conflict, Rome conducted a cold war that weakened
Carthage materially and spiritually. This cold war included all the tactics used today by Communist
nations against the Free World: proxy warfare, terror, blackmail, psychological warfare, deception,
subversion, and propaganda.” Admiral Burke wrote the book’s introduction, in which he noted,
“General Armstrong is apparently the first student of the Punic Wars to observe Rome’s employment
against Carthage of every cold war device, from a proxy power to propaganda and psychological
warfare, all of which we seem to consider modern communist inventions. His book is the first to
analyze Rome’s strategy of the indirect approach in this ancient example of unconventional warfare.”
75. “The League to Save Carthage,” April 1988, in McMichael private collection.
76. Barnett to Casey, 3 March 1967; Barnett to Casey, 27 December 1963; Barnett to Casey, 2 March
1967; and Barnett to Casey, 25 August 1966; each of these letters can be found in William J. Casey
(WJC) Papers, Box 79, Folder 10, HIA.
77. David M. Abshire, “Winning the Cold War,” Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 4 October 2009,
http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/guests/s_646153.html.
78. “Frank Rockwell Barnett: Remarks by Richard M. Scaife,” National War College, Fort Leslie
McNair, Washington, DC, 30 September 1993, in McMichael private collection.
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Catholics, Jews, Protestants and agnostics . . . to stand shoulder to shoulder
against the expansion and barbarism of the Gulag Archipelago.79
The League remained in existence through the end of the Cold War. Through
it, Barnett introduced Abshire and Burke to Charles Ford of T. Mellon &
Sons and McMichael of the Scaife Foundation to provide the start-up funds
in 1962 for the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University (later
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS).80 Through the end
of the Cold War, CSIS played an important role in promoting conservative
views on U.S. foreign and defense policy, though by the 1990s it had become
more centrist.
In addition to the “informal” League, Barnett was instrumental in insti-
tutionalizing his ideas within the U.S. legal profession. He helped to create,
and served as the first director of, the American Bar Association (ABA) Stand-
ing Committee on Law and National Security. Because of the importance of
Congress in creating and approving national security legislation and because
large numbers of congressmen and their staffs were lawyers, Barnett believed
that having members of the profession learn about national security affairs
would likely shape their outlook in this area, ideally in such a way as to build
a bipartisan consensus. In 1962, he brought together Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (later
an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court), Chicago lawyer Morris I.
Liebman, and Admiral Mott (then judge advocate general of the U.S. Navy),
to lobby for the creation of a standing committee. Each of these individuals
shared a belief in “the important role members of the legal profession could
play in educating the nation about the competing values involved” in the Cold
War.81 In 1963, Barnett and his associates successfully made their case before
the ABA House of Delegates, and the standing committee was subsequently
formed.82 In the aftermath of its formation, the committee had an “impact
from high school classrooms and college campuses to boardrooms and the
halls of government.”83
Barnett’s most important legacy, the NSIC, was also created during this
period. He resigned his post at the IAS on the grounds that it had become
79. Frank Barnett, “League to Save Carthage,” n.d., in McMichael private collection.
80. James Allen Smith, Strategic Calling: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1962–1992
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 1993), p. 45.
81. “Tribute to Frank R. Barnett by R. Daniel McMichael.”
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid. For additional details on the committee’s role in educating lawyers in the field of national
security, see Jill D. Rhodes, ed. National Security Law: Fifty Years of Transformation, An Anthology
(Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2012).
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too extreme and was therefore undermining efforts to attract mainstream anti-
Communists from across the political spectrum.84 In 1962, he turned his
attention to setting up a non-profit corporation that would serve as a “cata-
logue” and “clearinghouse” for “materials on national defense and the nature of
the challenge from the Sino-Soviet Axis.”85 The key audiences for these books,
films, and other materials were “inquiring educators, lawyers, reserve officers
and the general public.”86 Barnett noted that prominent individuals had been
“turned off by extremists who discredit the struggle against communist ag-
gression,” but “if these leaders can be provided with a scholarly, non-partisan
analysis, I am sure they will do their part to strengthen national will in the
face of pressures for massive disengagement, unilateral disarmament and/or a
new isolationism.”87
Upon being established, the New York City–based NSIC was officially de-
scribed as a tax-exempt institution organized to conduct educational programs
on national defense. Its board consisted of many of Barnett’s long-standing
associates, including Casey, Joseph Coors, and Frank Shakespeare. Like the
IAS, NSIC received its funding from a conservative philanthropist, though
this time through the Scaife family instead of the Richardson Foundation. By
all accounts, Barnett enjoyed the complete confidence of Richard Scaife. Hav-
ing access to large amounts of foundation money allowed Barnett to channel
financial resources via NSIC into areas he deemed important. Contrasting
Barnett’s approach to NSIC with his own management of CSIS, Abshire ob-
served: “Whereas I was more oriented toward trying to shape the Congress
and the presidency, he was the outside man to develop strategic consensus with
colleges, universities, lawyers, and other professionals.”88
NSIC was mainly involved in shaping public policy through its educa-
tional activities, particularly its Defense Strategy Seminar series.89 In Barnett’s
view, students trained in the discipline of national security studies “would
quickly gravitate to Washington to serve as aides to Senators and Congress-
men; others become media specialists in defense matters.” Moreover, they
84. Barnett to Fisher, 17 January 1963, in WRK Papers, Box 68, Folder 1, HIA.
85. Barnett to Kintner, 28 August 1962, in WRK Papers, Box 68, Folder 1, HIA.
86. Ibid.
87. Barnett to Kintner, 22 June 1962, in WRK Papers, Box 68, Folder 1, HIA.
88. Abshire, “Winning the Cold War.”
89. As Barnett noted in 1982, “We organize, in Washington, DC, a Defense Strategy Forum six times
a year—for about 250 executives from the Pentagon, defense aides on Capitol Hill, journalists and
aerospace industry types. Previous speakers have included Gene Rostow, Secretary of the Army Jack
Marsh, John Lehman, BingWest, and Admiral TomMoorer.” See Barnett to O’Neill, 18 August 1982,
in Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), Menaul 9/84.
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would “offer some balance in the public debate with . . . ‘pacifist and unilat-
eral disarmament’ academics.”90 As one U.S. military officer put it, NSIC “is
involved in a variety of activities designed to influence public opinion through
the intellectual elite that leads the way.”91 Building on the model and contacts
Barnett had developed earlier, educational programs for both civilian and mil-
itary audiences were a core feature of NSIC’s activities. For instance, in the late
1960s, to counterbalance the anti-Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)
movements that had sprung up on many campuses in response to the Vietnam
War, NSIC helped fund and organize the ROTC Enrichment Program. This
program entailed paying guest lecturers to give talks to ROTC instructors and
cadets. During this period Barnett also worked with universities across the
United States to sponsor summer institutes in comparative politics for high
school teachers.92
One of the key relationships Barnett developed was with New York Uni-
versity (NYU) professor Frank Trager, who also becameNSIC’s head of studies.
In the late 1960s, Barnett and Trager developed the National Security Educa-
tion Program at NYU, a summer seminar for teaching about national security.
As part of this program, a series of conferences were sponsored “for college
and university faculty members interested in the teaching of national security,
defense policy, civil-military relations, defense economics, and related areas.”93
One of the aims of these seminars was to coordinate the efforts of “scattered
scholars in the field of strategy.”94 Faculty included senior officials, retired gen-
erals, and numerous well-known academics in the field, such as Klaus Knorr,
Fred Sondermann, and Bernard Brodie, as well as junior academics such as
Paul Wolfowitz. These strategy seminars were then expanded into a series of
Regional National Security Education conferences, such as the summer semi-
nars held in Colorado and Chicago in the early 1970s.95 Textbooks were also
90. Frank R. Barnett, “Is There Any Further Need to Sustain University Education in Geopolitics,
Defense and Military Affairs?” August 1990, in FRB Papers, HIA.
91. Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, “Watching the Pendulum Swing: A Look at the Works of the
National Strategy Information Center,” Air University Review, October 1977, p. 2.
92. Barnett to Walters, 6 July 1973, in CIA CREST. In this letter Barnett states, “During the five
years of the ROTC Enrichment Program, we commissioned 233 civilian professors to give 1,503
lectures to ROTC cadets on 201 campuses. . . . Finally our Strategy Papers were distributed to 500
campuses for use in upgrading the ROTC curriculum.” See also Michael S. Neiberg, ROTC and the
Ideology of American Military Service (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 142–
144.
93. Barnett to O’Neill, 18 August 1982, in LHCMA, Menaul 9/84.
94. Pfaltzgraff, interview.
95. Barnett to O’Neill, 18 August 1982.
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designed to provide readers with “an introductory course in national security
affairs.”96
From the Margins to the Mainstream
Political interest in pursuing a hardline anti-Communist agenda probably
reached its low point in the early to mid-1970s because of a combination of
the weariness caused by the Vietnam War, the perceived success of the Nixon
administration’s de´tente with the Soviet Union, and the normalization of U.S.
relations with China. Under such inauspicious circumstances it was highly
unlikely that the epistemic community Barnett had helped to foster over the
previous two decades could make any significant impact on U.S. policy. By
the mid-to-late 1970s, however, the political environment shifted to one that
was more accepting of taking a stronger stance against the Soviet Union. The
epistemic community of anti-Communist hardliners was ready to exploit this
shift, with Barnett playing a leading role.
In 1976, Barnett moved from New York to Washington, DC, to create a
new NSIC office there. He envisaged the Washington office as allowing NSIC
to “interact with officials, tutor congressional staffs and brief congress mem-
bers, work with trade associations with an interest in defense,” and generate
more public information.97 In a letter to Eugene Rostow, who was one of the
lead figures responsible for setting up the CPD during that period, Barnett
noted that NSIC “had been granted $1 million to ‘crank up’ an all-out effort
to meet the current and growing threat from the USSR.”98 Rostow was im-
pressed with the size and scale of Barnett’s activities relative to those envisaged
for the CPD. In the following years, Barnett maintained a close relationship
with CPD organizers such as Rostow and Charles Tyroler II, and was also a
CPD member himself. NSIC sponsored many of the CPD’s members to give
talks to elite audiences and published papers authored by them. In this way,
NSIC played an important role in amplifying their common message.
96. Frank Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., National Security and American Society (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1973), p. 5. Another textbook that derived from the NSIC-NYU National
Security Program is Alden Williams and David W. Tarr, eds., Modules in Security Studies (Lawrence:
University of Kansas, 1974).
97. Barnett to Rostow, 24 May 1976, in CPD Papers, Box 284, HIA.
98. Ibid. I have been unable to obtain any further details about this funding, such as its source, whether
NSIC was paid $1 million as a lump sum, and so forth. As a subject for future research, addressing the
issue of the funding of the anti-de´tente movement during this period would shed important new light
on the backstory of the movement’s success.
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Whereas the CPD’s activities were quite visible, NSIC opted formore low-
key methods of spreading the samemessages. Barnett’s center thus remained in
the background, and the CPD attracted the limelight. Among the less-visible
aspects of NSIC’s “all-out effort” was the influencing of Congress. Working
with James E. Dornan, Jr., of Catholic University and John Tierney, executive
director of the Congressional Caucus on National Defense in the U.S. House
of Representatives, Barnett organized a lecture series beginning in 1976 for
members of Congress and “senior staff members of the United States Senate
andHouse of Representatives who have professional responsibilities in the area
of U.S. national security policy.”99 In typical fashion, Barnett was apolitical,
seeking to convey the anti-de´tente agenda to Republicans andDemocrats alike.
An additional national security affairs textbook was produced based on these
lectures.100 As for NSIC’s role in building up grassroots political support, the
center created an “international labor program,” headed by Roy Godson, and
worked closely with the American Federation of Teachers.101
Throughout this period, the number of NSIC publications expanded con-
siderably. In addition to the national security textbooks, NSIC produced two
series of shorter topical publications known as “Strategy Papers” and “Agenda
Papers.” The authors of these papers were well-known academics, both in
the national security field and in Soviet studies.102 A consistent underlying
theme to these publications was that from Moscow’s perspective de´tente was
merely a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Thus, the USSR’s goal
of “world domination” had not fundamentally changed. Another consistent
theme was that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union and that
plausible “remedial steps” needed to be taken to reverse this trend. As such, the
tone was one of concern rather than alarm, with the desired audience being the
political “middle ground.”103 Although their precise impact is difficult to deter-
mine, NSIC’s publications provided one of the few outlets available for hard-
line experts to present their views to a policymaking audience. Furthermore,
99. “NSIC Highlights of Activities for the Quarter Ending March 31, 1977,” in CPD Papers, Box
284, HIA.
100. James E. Dornan, Jr., ed., United States National Security Policy in the Decade Ahead (London:
MacDonald and Jane’s, 1978); and Richard B. Foster, “In Memoriam, James E. Dornan, Jr., 1938–
1979,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 1979), pp. 112–113.
101. “NSIC Highlights of Activities for the Quarter Ending March 31, 1977.”
102. For instance, Norman Polmar wrote on Soviet naval matters, William F. Scott wrote on Soviet
military doctrine, and Richard Pipes wrote about Soviet ideology, among other topics.
103. Mets, “Watching the Pendulum Swing,” p. 2. See also Linda Charlton, “Groups Favoring Strong
Defense Making Gains in Public Acceptance,” The New York Times, 4 April 1977, p. 50.
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Barnett’s ability to attract these experts further enhanced the respectability and
importance of NSIC within the anti-de´tente milieu.
By the late 1970s, Barnett was involved in supporting Reagan’s election
campaign. In the run-up to the election, Barnett was officially named one of
Reagan’s defense policy advisers.104 In addition, he was a strong proponent of
missile defense and served on a panel along with Edward Teller dealing with
X-ray lasers, otherwise referred to as the “High Frontier Panel.”105 However,
rather than become an active member of the Reagan administration, Barnett
preferred to continue to work from behind the scenes, including in support of
the administration’s public diplomacy efforts.106
Throughout the 1980s, NSIC remained active in two key areas supporting
the Reagan administration’s stepped-up efforts to confront the Soviet Union.
First, NSIC supported efforts to resuscitate ideas on “low-intensity conflict”
that had fallen out of favor within the U.S. military in the aftermath of
Vietnam.Barnett’s friends and colleaguesCasey andMarsh had been appointed
director of central intelligence and Secretary of the Army respectively, thus
giving NSIC the advantage of unique access to two of the key policymakers
responsible for running clandestine and covert operations.107 Working with the
National Defense University, NSIC cosponsored two important conferences
and published the proceedings. The first conference focused on the topic of
“special operations.”108 The second returned to Barnett’s long-standing interest
in “political warfare.”109 Both conferences drew impressive crowds of senior
civilian and military officials dealing with these subjects.
104. Don Oberdorfer, “Reagan Names 67 Foreign, Defense Policy Advisers,” The Washington Post, 22
April 1980, p. 1; and George C. Wilson, “A Buildup in U.S. Forces: Reagan Advisers Urge Military
Build-Up,” The Washington Post, 16 June 1980, p. 1.
105. Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI: 1944–1983 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1992), pp. 145, 149, 238 n. 88.
106. See, for instance, Raymond, Jr., to Clark, 25 September 1982; and Raymond, Jr., to Clark, 3
March 1983. Both memoranda are available via the Declassified Documents Reference System.
107. Many individuals associated with NSIC and the CPD took up senior posts in the Reagan
administration. By one count, some 32 of the 182 members of the CPD served in the administration.
See David Shribman, “Group Goes from Exile to Influence,” The New York Times, 23 November 1981,
p. A20. While serving as director of central intelligence, Casey continued his correspondence with
Barnett and took an interest in NSIC activities. See, for instance, Barnett to Casey, 5 August 1981;
Casey to Barnett, 17 August 1981; Casey to Barnett, 27 October 1983; and Casey to Barnett, 9 March
1984; all in WJC Papers, Box 320, Folder 1, HIA.
108. Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard Shultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984).
109. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, eds., Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking
the US Approach (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989).
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A secondmajor focus area for NSIC was in the field of intelligence studies.
Hoping to reverse the trend in the 1970s when the intelligence community
was rocked by scandals and criticism, NSIC sought to shift the U.S. debate on
intelligence “away from issues of constraint, charters, legislation and account-
ability towards the issues of effectiveness, efficiency and capacity.”110 To this
end, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence was created within NSIC
in 1979. Godson led a multiyear project that resulted in a multivolume study
on Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s. This study had the dual purpose
of trying to influence public policy as well as provide a “model syllabus” for
the teaching of intelligence. An important part of the Consortium’s purpose
was to promote education in this area.111 Apart from sponsoring seminars on
intelligence pedagogy, the Consortium was also responsible for setting up the
Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association.112
A Transnational Network
Much of the literature on anti-Communist groups outside the United States
assumes that the U.S. government was their main sponsor. Although this
was true for many such groups, particularly before the late 1960s and early
1970s, after whichmany of the CIA’s covert connections to themwere exposed
and subsequently abandoned, relatively little attention has been paid to the
sponsorship role of U.S. private networks.113 Similarly, there has been little
appreciation of the differences between government and private sponsorship.
Whereas government sponsorship required these groups to have an agenda
consistent with U.S. foreign policy, private sponsorship required them to have
an agenda consistent with that of their private sponsors, who tended to be
more politically hardline.
110. Kenneth G. Robertson, “Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s,” Intelligence and National
Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1987), p. 158.
111. Shultz, interview.
112. As Arthur Hulnick observes, “Courses on intelligence are now [the early 1990s] being taught
at dozens of colleges and universities. Most of these courses have been developed by academics who
have either been connected with the intelligence system in some way, or who have received a boost
by participating in the series sponsored by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence.” See Arthur
S. Hulnick, “Learning about U.S. intelligence: Difficult but Not Impossible,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 96. See alsoMarjorieW. Cline, ed.,
Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1980s (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Study Center, 1985).
113. For a recent study highlighting the importance of taking a transnational approach to the analysis of
anti-Communist state-private networks during the Cold War, see Luc van Dongen, Ste´phanie Roulin,
and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and
Networks (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
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As head of NSIC, Barnett regularly travelled abroad to give lectures and
establish links with other Cold Warriors.114 During these travels, especially in
Europe, he was often treated like a visiting dignitary.115 One of the reasons for
this special treatment was that one of Barnett’s self-assigned jobs was to identify
like-minded organizations in need of funding. As the Cold War progressed,
many anti-Communist groups found themselves in increasingly dire financial
straits. Thus, Barnett’s role was particularly important during this period given
his access to large amounts of foundation money.
Perhaps the most important of Barnett’s international relationships was
with Brian Crozier, an anti-Communist journalist who headed Forum World
Features and was probably Barnett’s closest equivalent, at least in the United
Kingdom.116 Barnett first met Crozier in Madrid in the late 1960s. Through
Barnett’s connection withMcMichael, Crozier was able to acquire the funds to
set up the controversial Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) in London in
1970.117 NSIC also cosponsored the first of ISC’s Annual of Power and Conflict
series.118 After Crozier’s resignation from the ISC in 1979, Barnett maintained
a close relationship with his successor,Michael Goodwin.119 Barnett’s other key
UK contacts included former Air Vice-Marshal Stewart “Paddy”Menaul, head
of the Royal United Services Institute from 1968 to 1976; Admiral Sir Louis Le
Bailly, former director general of intelligence at the BritishMinistry of Defence
114. According to one account: “At least once a year, Barnett visits with statesmen, scholars and defense
officials in Europe. He has lectured to the NATO Defense College in Paris and to similar institutes
as far apart as Taiwan, Panama, and Great Britain. He regularly attends the European-based seminars
of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London and INTERDOC in the Hague. This year he will be
helping to produce a film on NATO for US and European television. . . . Barnett also lectures at annual
conventions of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Young Presidents Association, the NAM, the
Reserve Officers Association, and the International Association of Insurance Counsel.” “PB Atlantic
Will Dedicate American Studies Institute,” Palm Beach Daily News, 14 March 1970, p. 1.
115. Although Barnett’s main contacts were in Europe, he was also concerned with Pacific security
issues. For instance, he developed close links with Jun Tsunoda, then director of the Japanese Center
for Strategic Studies. During his UK visits, Barnett often met many Conservative politicians, former
military and intelligence officers, and businessmen. Typically, these meetings were set up by former
Air Vice-Marshal Paddy Menaul. Details of the meetings can be found in Menaul’s files at the Liddell
Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College, London.
116. Forum World Features was a CIA-funded propaganda operation working under the cover of a
commercial news service.
117. Brian Crozier, Free Agent: The Unseen War 1941–1991 (London: HarperCollins Publishers,
1993), pp. 74, 90, 93, 184. See also Jeffrey H. Michaels, “The Heyday of Britain’s Cold War Think
Tank: Brian Crozier and the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970–1979,” in Dongen, Roulin, and
Scott-Smith, eds., Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War, pp. 146–160.
118. Brian Crozier, ed., Annual of Power and Conflict 1971: A Survey of Political Violence and Interna-
tional Influence (London: Eastern Press, 1972).
119.Michael Ivens, “Arms and the QuietMan,” The Guardian (Manchester, UK), 10 September 1988,
p. 39.
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and later ISC vice chairman; and Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, a Conservative
politician who founded the Foreign Affairs Research Institute.120
Although Barnett made numerous trips to the UK to give lectures, his
work as an organizer of international strategy conferences is what stands out
as his main achievement. Barnett used his long list of European contacts to
build personal and institutional bonds across the Atlantic and to advocate
on behalf of a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He also
helped to sponsor and organize transnational conferences that extended beyond
Europe. His objective was to create a consensus on anti-Communist strategy
among a global network of “Cold Warriors,” especially those who were active
in strategic studies or who headed foreign policy institutes.
The firstmajor conference Barnett helped organize was held inWinchester
in November 1976. Participants included the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, General Alexander Haig, and Strausz-Hupe´, then U.S. ambassador to
NATO.121 The second conference, on “NATO and the Global Threat,” was
held in Brighton in June 1978 and included delegates from twenty countries.122
The most important and high-profile of these conferences was the Annual
World Balance of Power series he organized with Stewart-Smith. Held at
Leeds Castle, the first of these conferences took place in July 1980 and was
considered a pilot conference for those to follow.123 Stewart-Smith remarked
that the purpose of the conference was “to establish whether or not one could
get a group of Americans, Europeans and Japanese to agree on a core of
common thinking” regarding the Cold War.124 Over the next several years,
additional conferences were held at Leeds Castle, though with a more global
list of participants.125 The conference series had the endorsement of Reagan,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and NATO Secretary General
Joseph Luns, all of whom wrote short letters in support of it. However, even
120. Whether Barnett and Stewart-Smith had met each other as of the mid-1960s is unclear. However,
the latter quotes the former in his 1966 book. SeeGeoffrey Stewart-Smith,No Vision Here: Non-Military
Warfare in Britain (Petersham, UK: FAPC, 1966), pp. 4, 116.
121. Barnett to Menaul, 28 July 1977, in LHCMA, Menaul 11/110/4.
122. Barnett to Haig, 26 January 1979, in LHCMA, Menaul 11/110/4.
123. The proceedings from this first conference can be found in Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, ed., Towards
a Grand Strategy for Global Freedom (Richmond, UK: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1981).
124. Stewart-Smith to Barnett, 7 October 1981, in LHCMA Menaul 11/110/8.
125. “The aim of this conference is to consider and develop a global response by the nations of the
non-Communist world to the growth of Soviet military might, political warfare, and subversion. . . .
Participants shall beMinisters, Ambassadors, High Commissioners, heads of strategic studies institutes,
professional strategists, defence analysts and financial sponsors. The numbers shall be limited to 90
and will be invited from some 30 countries.” Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, “Second Annual World Balance
of Power Conference: A Description of Purpose,” December 1981, in LHCMA, Menaul 11/110/8.
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though the conferencewas no doubt useful in bringing like-minded individuals
together, which for Barnett was probably its main achievement, Stewart-Smith
came away somewhat disappointed. He had originally hoped that one of the
“deliverables” would be a strategy document, like NSC-68 but global in scope,
that would serve to guide a renewed anti-Soviet strategy in the 1980s. Such a
document failed to materialize, however.
In addition to his relationships in Britain, Barnett had numerous dealings
with like-minded groups in continental Europe. From at least the mid-1960s
on, he maintained contact with former Dutch intelligence official Cees van
denHeuvel, head of the International Information andDocumentationCenter
(Interdoc). The purpose of Interdoc was “to increase the level of understand-
ing of communist doctrine and practice by stimulating and making available
well-researched information on the policies and realities of the Soviet bloc.”126
In addition to providing research publications, Interdoc was also involved in
training intelligence analysts and sponsoring academic conferences. Though
initially aWestern European project sponsored byWest Germany, the Nethler-
lands, and France, its sponsors had cut off funding by the mid-1960s. Barnett
served as an intermediary helping van den Heuvel secure new financial sup-
port from the U.S. private sector. However, important ideological differences
between Barnett and van den Heuvel ensured that their relationship, though
cordial, was not optimal. Whereas Interdoc sought to engage with the Soviet
bloc as a way to spread Western ideas, Barnett viewed any interaction with the
“enemy” in negative terms.127
Throughout the 1980s, Barnett continued his efforts to build interna-
tional coalitions to “challenge both the Soviet Empire’s military threat and
ideological weaponry across the whole spectrum of public opinion.”128 These
efforts included fundraising for pro-NATO and anti-Soviet groups in
Europe.129 Barnett also developed and sponsored a seminar series based inWest
Germanymodeled on the seminars NSIC held in theUnited States. InNovem-
ber 1980, Barnett andWerner Kaltefleiter of Christian-Albrechts University in
Kiel created an annual summer course for up-and-coming students of strategy.
126. “Applying the principles of Leninism in reverse, Interdoc’s role was to establish training facilities
for aspiring individuals who would then form a kind of anti-communist intellectual vanguard within
each nation’s body politic.” See Giles Scott-Smith, “Confronting Peaceful Co-existence: Psychological
Warfare and the Role of Interdoc, 1963–72,” Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February 2007), p. 26.
127. For information on Barnett’s relationship with van den Heuvel and Interdoc more generally, see
Giles Scott-Smith, Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), “pp. 165, 190–222, 243.
128. Barnett to Casey, 3 February 1984, in WJC Papers, Box 320, Folder 1, HIA.
129. Barnett to Casey, 11 August 1982, in WJC Papers, Box 320, Folder 1, HIA.
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Each summer course, known as the “International Summer Course on Na-
tional Security,” consisted of “future opinion leaders” from about 30 countries.
Topics included the “global Soviet threat” and “communist subversion.” The
course was mainly funded through NSIC and continue beyond the end of the
Cold War, by which time Barnett was eager to invite students from former
Soviet-bloc countries to participate.130
Conclusion
On the evening of 15 December 1982, a celebration was held at the Inter-
national Club in Washington to celebrate NSIC’s twentieth anniversary and
to honor Barnett, its president. The guests consisted of a “who’s who” of the
U.S. national security community, the conservative foreign policy establish-
ment, and well-known Cold Warriors. Sitting at Barnett’s table were Casey,
Marsh, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle´, Prescott Bush, Jr.,
and McMichael.131 Although this gathering of notables was relatively inconse-
quential, it nevertheless probably represented the pinnacle of Barnett’s career
as a Cold War activist and reflected the important position NSIC held within
this community. That Barnett was not well-known outside this community is
hardly surprising given his preference for working behind the scenes. Rather
than seeking a high-profile position to shape public policy, Barnett was content
to serve as a focal point and organizer of networks of like-minded policymak-
ers, scholars, and philanthropists. Thus, knowledge of his activities was limited
to an elite audience, with the consequence that those activities have heretofore
received little scholarly attention.
Even if Barnett’s views on the nature of the Soviet threat were hardly orig-
inal, his approach to Cold War activism most certainly was. Yet, his achieve-
ments can be properly appreciated only in the context of the wider epistemic
community he helped to create and sustain, and their instrumental role in
generating and disseminating ideas. Perhaps the key difficulty lies in trying to
assess or quantify the impact of an epistemic community and the individuals
who compose it. In the case of Barnett, this is most certainly a difficult task,
130. Kaltefleiter referred to Barnett as the “spiritual father” of the course. The contents of the course
changed after 1991. See Werner Kaltefleiter and Ulrike Schumacher, “In Memoriam: Frank Barnett,”
in Conflicts, Options, Strategies in a Threatened World, Papers Presented at the International Summer
Course on National Security, 1993 (Kiel: Institute of Political Science, Christian-Albrechts-University,
1994), pp. 1–2.
131. Notes from the dinner, in LHCMA, Menaul Papers, 9/83/1.
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even though he attempted such assessments himself, regularly citing the output
(seminars, publications, etc.) of the institutions he headed. However, whereas
“capacity building” can to some degree be assessed in quantitative terms, it is
essential to consider qualitative factors that are more difficult to measure. As
Barnett himself observed, the vast majority of the day-to-day work associated
with waging a “war of ideas” was rather banal and seemed to achieve little, at
least in the short term. Instead, assessing the long-term impact of Barnett and
his “fellow travelers” requires focusing on their key role over two decades in
shaping the political, bureaucratic, and expert discourse on the “Soviet threat.”
The evidence presented in this article underscores how U.S. policy dis-
course during the Cold War was crucially influenced by private individuals
working outside the political mainstream. The article revises the traditional
reductionist interpretation that attributes to the CPD more credit than it
probably merits for the anti-de´tente shift in U.S. policy in the latter half of
the1970s. The key problem of this interpretation is that it ignores the much
larger and more long-standing epistemic community of which the CPD was
a part. Examining the origins and evolution of this epistemic community—
and the integral role Barnett played in fostering it—sheds light on a missing
dimension of the private sector in the Cold War. Scholars will, one hopes,
finally recognize Barnett’s activism as being of a similar or greater importance
than the work undertaken by better known groups such as the CPD. Both the
quantity and the quality of Barnett’s activities, as well as those of the wider
community he helped facilitate, suggest his impact was far-reaching. They are,
therefore, a worthy subject of analysis in the field of Cold War studies.
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